Abstract-A bus iness process can be developed as a compo sition of Web services provided by different service providers.
I. INTRODUCTION
Cloud computing infrastructure and semantic Web tech nologies have together created unprecedented opportunities for composing large-scale business processes and workflow-based applications that span multiple organizational domains. One of primary hurdles towards wide-spread adoption of Web services in a collaborative environment is security and policy disclosure from the perspective of both service providers and service requesters. For example, sensitive information that can be attributed to individual service providers or service requesters should not be disclosed [1] , [2] . Similarly, local business process details of one entity should not be disclosed to other entities. Given such diverse security and privacy requirements, Web service composition in the cloud environment poses ma jor challenges. In this paper, we focus on secure composition of Web service in publicly available clouds as well as in enterprise clouds. We consider Web service composition from service enactment perspective [3] . Service enactment deals with finding an execution plan, that conforms to the overall requirements and constraints of the composite service specified by the requester, and satisfies the security and access control policies of individual Web services. Figure 1 depicts the main aspects of distributed composition of Web services that involves orchestration of many atomic or composite Web services to complete a multi-step business process in shared services cloud. We refer to such Web services as component Web services and their composition as a Web service process (WSP). Component Web services can be modeled as a finite state machine (FSM), though due to privacy and security concerns, only a partial view of the FSM may be visible to the requester. For example in Figure 1 , the dark filled circles corresponds to visible Web service operations while the white circles are the invisible internal operations. These internal operations may in turn invoke Web services of other service providers. This is consistent with the notion of partner links in BPEL, where only certain operations of partners are visible to the organization. However, an operation of the partner link may itself be a BPEL process which is invisible to the organization invoking such operation.
The WSP specifications consist of the control-flow and information-flow dependencies among the component Web services and a set of constraints. Constraints are used to define global requirements over the WSP [3] . These requirements can be classified as: i) aggregate service quality constraints (e.g., overall cost of executing the WSP); and ii) Event constraints (e.g., event a cannot occur between events b and c). As depicted in Figure 1 , a component Web service can be com posed of multiple Web services and therefore can have its own aggregate and event constraints that need to be considered for WSP enactment. Composing cascaded Web services securely in such a distributed environment is a challenging task, that nevertheless occurs in many real life situations, as discussed below:
Illustrative Example: Consider State health department countermeasure inventory management process for tracking inventory of critical medical countermeasures (e.g., antivirals) in different localities. In case of shortage of countermeasure supplies in any local jurisdiction, the State health department may mobilize supplies from its stockpile or from the private sector pharmaceutical supply chain to that local jurisdiction. As depicted in Figure 1 , this process involves interaction with the inventory management and resource planning systems of various stakeholders including state and local health agencies and emergency response organizations, hospital, clinics, and private sector pharmaceutical supply chain entities, including retail pharmacies, distributors and manufactures. The individ ual Web services of the stakeholders' system may also be complex business processes as depicted in Figure 2 . These services may be hosted on different enterprise clouds and need to be linked together to compose the global process. For example, the inventory management and supply acquisition services of public health agencies are hosted on Govt. ser vices cloud; hospitals and clinic host their inventory tracking and ordering services on health services cloud; and private sector pharmaceutical entities provide their services on the pharmaceutical supply chain cloud as shown in Figure 1 .
The entire WSP may have several event constraints: i) If the inventory in the stockpile of the local jurisdiction (city/town; county) is not at satisfactory level, only then the inventory of the private sector entities (hospitals/clinics, pharmacies) is to be checked. ii) If the inventory level of a hospital has already been reported for one locality then the inventory level of that hospital cannot be reported later for another locality. For the first constraint, the temporal dependencies between events (Event 1: reporting of the local jurisdiction inventory below satisfactory level. Event 2: checking hospitals, phar macies inventories in that locality) can be represented in the event algebra formalism of Concurrent Transaction Logic [3] as: \Jlocall nvN otOK 0 (\J I nvokej nvC heck(H ospitals)/\ \J InvokejnvCheck(Pharmacies)); where, \Je 0 \J f im plies that event e must occur before event f.
Given the information disclosure and privacy concerns re lated to Web service operations and event message attribution, enactment and execution of a WSP become a challenging issue when considering the following scenarios:
The events specified in a WSP constraint may occur as internal operations of component Web services that are not exported globally. Moreover, different events in a WSP constraint may occur at different component Web services. For example in and are not visible to County A that has invoked the inventory reporting services of these cities. S2.
The events specified in a WSP constraint have or dering and temporal dependencies that may span multiple component Web services.
S3.
The WSP constraints are not disclosed globally. Such scenarios are likely to occur in the countermeasure inventory tracking example of Figure 1 . For example, a local jurisdiction may not reveal which hospitals/pharmacies' inventory management services it has used for reporting the countermeasure stock information in its region (scenario SI). Similarly, there is a temporal dependency between events included in constraint 1, e.g., stockpile of local health agency need to be checked first before checking the inventory of private sector entities (scenario S2). The challenge here is . that there is no single party who is aware of all the operatIOns of component Web services that need to be enacted for WSP composition. Therefore, no party can verify whether the interactions among the component services conform to a given constraint associated with the WSP.
Contribution: In this paper, we develop an automata theoretic model checking approach with encryption strategy for enactment of a cascaded Web service process in a secure and privacy preserving manner. The proposed approach em ploys Finite State Machine (FSM) for modeling component Web service operations, their interdependencies, the global constraints of requesters, as well as security policies of service providers. The proposed approach generates the execution plan in an incremental manner. In terms of security and privacy, the proposed approach prevents disclosure of policies and internal operations of service providers against service requesters at different levels in the composition hierarchy.
II. PRELIMINARIES
We now present the formalism and notations used to repre sent Web services, execution plans, and WSP constraints. 
B. Execution Plan
An execution plan of a given Web service is basically a sequence of operations that need to be invoked for successful completion of the given Web service [3] . Since, a Web service is characterized by the set of operations it can execute and the interdependencies/constraints among these operations, it can be modeled by finite state machines (FSM) [4] Similar to concurrent transaction logic (CTR) [3] , we con sider primitive constraints, immediate serial constraints, serial constraints and allow composition of these constraints. Figure 4 (a)) is used to represent if an event e E �e must occur or must not occur in the execution plan. In the CTR formalism, this is represented by Ve (must occur -positive prim itive constraints) and -, V e (must not occur -negative primitive constraints). An example of the positive prim itive constraint with reference to the inventory tracking process of Figure 1 is checking the local inventory of each jurisdiction for every countermeasure X, i.e., vlocalInvCheck(?x) must occur in the execution plan. The above constraints or constraints composed from the above constraints can be converted to the normal form [3] :
1) Primitive constraint (depicted in
Vi(Ajserialconstri,j) where each serialconstri,j is either a primitive constraint or a serial constraint composed of two positive primitive constraints. The set fonned by such constraints is a closed set. Since the FSM representation allows modeling of complex constraints from primitive constraints, immediate serial constraints, and serial constraints using the V and A operators, any constraint that can be represented in CTR can also be represented as an FSM. The above expression implies that 7rwsp is a trace of the FSM composed from FSMwsp, Cwsp, and the FSMs of all the component Web services and constraints. We consider a hierarchical structure among the different entities involved in service composition as depicted in Figure 6 . This hierarchy is established based on the roles of these entities as a service requester or as a service provider at different levels of the composition. At the lowest level (level = 0), the original WSP is the service requester and the component Web services that have direct interaction with the WSP as service providers. At the next level these service providers become service requesters and the component Web services invoked by them are the service providers and so on.
Given the service enactment definition above and the Web service composition hierarchy of Figure 6 , the goal is to compute 7rwsp in a secure and privacy preserving way. The security requirement is entailed in service enactment definition in terms of satisfaction of all the constraints and process spec ifications. Privacy entails the following three requirements. P-III The constraints CST; are local to the service requester sri and are not disclosed to any service provider at level i or higher.
IV. SECURE SERVICE ENACTMENT
The proposed approach achieves service enactment and generates a WSP execution plan along the service compo sition hierarchy ( Figure 6 ) in an incremental and bottom-up manner in accordance with the requester's specification and all providers' security policies. After generation of the WSP execution plan, the execution plan for individual component Web services is extracted and disclosed to the service providers in a top-down manner. In terms of privacy, the approach can be configured to satisfy the meaningful combinations of above privacy requirements P-I, P-II, and P-III.
A. Basic Idea
Service enactment in a cascaded Web service environment involves two major tasks: i) generation of the overall WSP execution plan; and ii) Extraction of the execution plans for individual Web services from the overall WSP execution plan. The second task ensures that the execution plan of any given individual Web service is consistent with the overall execution plan generated at level o. Since individual Web service may have multiple execution plans, it is critical to select a plan consistent with the overall WSP execution.
Generation of WSP Execution Plan. The basic idea for generating WSP execution plan is simple and can be sUlmnarized in the following steps.
1) Assuming that the leaf nodes of the service compo sition hierarchy tree ( Figure 6 ) is at level n, each service provider sp at level n sends a composition of its component Web service FSM and constraints FSM (FSMsp II Csp) to the service requester at level n that has invoked its service.
2) The service requester (sri) at level i (i :s; n) upon receiving the FSMs from the service providers at level i verifies if the composition of all the FSMs satisfies its process specification and constraints. In case the privacy requirement P-III is not considered, i.e., sri knows the process specification and constraints of all service requesters at level j < i, then these are also included for constraint verification. 
Extraction and Disclosure of Execution Plans for in
dividual Web Services. The execution plan for individual component Web services is extracted from the overall WSP execution plan and is disclosed to the service providers of the corresponding services in a top down manner along the service composition hierarchy as summarized in the following steps.
1) The original service requester at level 0, sro, after computing the execution plan 7rWSP from the combined FSM sends 7rWSP to its immediate service providers (who are also service requesters at level 1).
2) When a service requester srI at level 1 receives the overall execution plan 7rw sp, it extracts the execution plan specific to its Web service, i.e., 7r ST, from 7rw SP by projecting only those states and events that are included in the FSM composed by srI from the FSMs of its service providers. For this extraction, the PRO J operation described in Section II is used.
After computing 7rST I' srI send its execution plan down ward to its immediate service providers for extraction of their execution plans. This process continues, until the execution plan is computed/extracted for all the service providers in the service composition hierarchy.
B. Proposed Approach.
To address the privacy requirements related to disclosure of policies and internal operations, an encryption based strategy can be used that enables constraint verification using model checking over an encrypted set of component Web service FSMs. This requires that all the component Web service FSMs of service providers as well as the constraint FSMs of service requester be encrypted with the same key. This can be achieved using commutative encryption*, whereby the component Web service FSM of each service provider at level i is commutatively encrypted by all other service providers at the same level using their respective encryption keys. Since service providers may not be known to each other, therefore the encryption of the component Web service and FSM can be coordinated through the service requester (sri)
However, this simple encryption strategy does not prevent the service requester to learn the operations or events in the component Web services of its service providers. For example service requester, sri, can correlate the commutatively en crypted value of certain event in its constraints FSM CSTi with the commutatively encrypted values in the components Web service FSM of a given service provider and learn that such event is included in the component Web service of the given service provider. The main reason for this problem is that at any given level both composition of FSMs and constraint verification is performed by the requester. Therefore, the commutatively encrypted FSM of each service provider is known to the requester. Another issue is the COlllil l unication overhead associated with the commutative encryption of each component Web service FSM by all service providers.
The proposed approach utilizes the hierarchical structure of the cascaded WS environment to separate out the task of coordinating encryption of component Web service FSMs and verification of the encrypted composite FSM for con straint satisfaction. Additionally, this relaxes the requirement of having each component Web service FSM encrypted by all service providers. Specifically, at any given level i the service requester sri receives the encrypted component Web service FSMs from each of its service providers. Each FSM is encrypted only with the encryption key of the corresponding service provider. These encrypted FSMs are used for gener ation of the encrypted composite FSM which is verified for * An encryption algorithm is commutative if the order of encryption does not matter. Thus, for any two encryption keys E1 and E2, and any message m, E1 (E2 (m)) = E2 (E1 (m)). The same property applies to decryption as well -thus to decrypt a message encrypted by two keys. it is sufficient to decrypt it one key at a time. receive ESTiEs P (7rsp) from sp and apply the decryption key DsT, to generate Esp(7rsp)
21:
send Esp(7rsp) to sp 22: end for constraint satisfaction one level up, i.e., at level (i -1). For this, it is assumed that the decryption key of each service provider at level i (where, i ?: 1) is known to the service requester sri-l at level i-I . However, the proposed approach ensures that such disclosure of the decryption key does not enable sri-l to learn the operations or events in the component Web services of the respective service providers. 1) Generation of WSP Execution Plan: The proposed ap proach for privacy preserving generation of WSP execution plan employs three protocols. Protocol 1 (Lines 1-13) is executed by the service requester at level i, Protocol 2 (Lines 1-4) is executed by each service provider at level i, and Protocol 3 is executed by the service requester at level i-I. The key interactions are as follows:
Step 1. Each service provider SPi at level i (i ?: 1) creates a set of commutative encryption and decryption keys and sends its decryption key to the service requester sri-l at level i -1. It then encrypts its component Web service FSM with its encryption key, and sends it to the requester sri at level i as send Error message to sri 13: end if illustrated in Figure 7 .
With reference to the running example, Figure 8 shows the execution plan generation and constraint verification for the counter measure inventory tracking process. In this figure, City 1 and City 2 are service providers at levell, and County A is the service requester at level 1. At level 0, State is the service requester. Both City 1 and City 2 send their decryption keys to the State. Moreover, each city encrypts is component Web service FSM with its encryption key and send it to the County A. The component Web service FSMs of City 1 and City 2 are depicted in Figure 3(b) and (c), respectively.
Step Web service FSMs of the service providers to the service requester sri-l at level i-I as illustrated in Figure 7 . In addition, sri encrypts its constraint FSM Csr, and constraints FSMs of service requesters at higher levels in the composition hierarchy, in case such constraints are visible to sri (i.e., privacy requirement P-III is not considered). These constraints FSMs encrypted with sr;'s encryption key are then sent to service requester sri-l at level i -1. Note that sri-l cannot correlate any event in the component Web service FSMs of the service providers and the encrypted constraint FSM of service requesters, as all constraint FSMs of service requesters (CSTj' j � i) are encrypted with the encryption key of sri only, whereas the component Web service and constraint FSM of service providers are encrypted with the encryption keys of all the service providers as well as by sri.
In the context of the running example, County A receives the encrypted FSM (ECity_1 (F S MCity_d) from City 1 and the encrypted FSM (ECity_2(FSMcity_2» from City 2 as depicted in Figure 8 . County A further encrypts these FSMS with its encryption key ECountY_A . In addition, County A encrypts its component Web service FSM (FSMcounty_A, shown in Figure 3 (a» and the WSP constraint FSM (Cwsp, shown in Figure 5 ) with its encryption key ECountY_A. Here we assume that CW SP which is the constraint defined by the State is visible to County A. After applying its encryption key, County A sends all the encrypted FSMs to its service requester, i.e., State as depicted in Figure 8 . For reason discussed above, State cannot learn which of the events in Cwsp occur at City 1 or City 2.
Step 3. sri-I receives the following set of encrypted FSM from sri: i) component Web service and constraint FSMs of service providers (FSMsp); ii) component Web service FSM and constraint FSM of the service requester sri (F SMSTJ I CST , ); iii) and if privacy requirement P-III is not considered, the encrypted constraint FSM of all service re questers above sri in the composition hierarchy. sri-I applies the decryption key of the respective service provider at level i to the corresponding component Web service FSM. Even after application of the decryption keys, such FSMs still remain encrypted with the encryption key of sri as the decryption key of sri is not known to sri-I. sri-I then generates a composite FSM by combining all the FSMs and check for existence of a trace in the composite FSM that leads to a service completion state without causing any of the constraint FSM to go into error state. The existence of such trace implies satisfaction of all the constraints and service requester specifications. Figure 7 illustrates the process of generating the execution plan and verif)'ing constraints at level i with two service providers SP}' , SpJ' ) , a service requester SR( i ) at level i and service requester SR( i -l) at level i -l.
With reference to the running example, the role of sri-I is played by State as shown in Figure 8 . The state re ceives the set of encrypted FSMs from County A. This set of FSMs includes: i) F SMCity_1 (shown in Figure  3 (b) encrypted with ECity_1 and ECounty_A; ii) FSMcity_2 (shown in Figure 3 (c»encrypted with ECitY_2 and ECounty_A; iii) FSMcountY_A (shown in Figure 3 (a» encrypted with ECountY_A; and iv) FSM of Cwsp (shown in Figure 5 ) encrypted with ECountY_A . The state has the decryption keys for City 1 and City 2. It applies the respective decryption key on the received FSM of City 1 and City 2. After this, the only encryption remaining on all the FSMs is that of County A. This enables the state to perform model checking , i.e., find an execution plan that leads to service completion without causing violation of the constraint Cw sp .
The above steps are repeated for levels i-I, i -2, ... and so on. However, at level 0 there is no other requester beyond sro that can verify the overall Cw sp, i.e., the constraints of the original requester. Therefore, at level 0, sro performs both composition of the FSM and checking for constraint verification. This may allow sro to learn the internal operations and events occurring during the execution of the component Web services by service providers at level O. However, the internal operations and events of service providers at level 1 or greater are not disclosed to sro.
In case the service providers at level 0 do not want to reveal their internal operations or events to the service requester sro, two alternatives can be considered: i) use a third party for constraint verification; and ii) use secure multiparty compu tation (SMC)approach. For the first alternative, protocol 1 is executed by sro and Protocol 3 is executed by the third party.
In addition, all the service providers running Protocol 2 at level o send their decryption keys to the third party. The second al ternative is the most general and secure. However, as discussed in the Introduction, the existing SMC techniques designed for related problems such as distributed policy composition [5] , trust negotiation [6] , set intersection and association mining [7] , [8] do not consider any ordering relation between input data. Also, the generic circuit evaluation solutions [9] , [10] are likely to be very inefficient and impractical.
2) Extraction of Individual WS Execution Plan: For ex traction of individual Web service execution plan Protocol 1 (Lines 14-22) is executed by the service requester at level i, Protocol 2 (Lines 5-10) is executed by each service provider at level i. We now explain the extraction process assuming that the service requester is at level 0 and the overall WSP execution plan 7rwsp has been computed using the protocol steps discussed above:
Step 1. Service requester sro has the component Web service FSM of each of its ilmnediate service provider's component Web service FSM which is commutatively en crypted with the encryption key of the respective service provider and sro. For any given service provider sp, sro sends the corresponding cOlmnutatively encrypted FSM (i.e.,
EST O Esp(FSMsp» to sp. In addition sro also encrypts its execution plan and send EST O (7rW sp ) to sp. 
. S State
The state encrypts this execution plan (7rwsP) with its encryption key EState and sends it to County A.
Step 2. The extraction of the execution plan is performed by the service requester by performing the P ROJ operation (discussed in Section II-B) over the execution plan received from the requester. Before applying the PRO J operation, the service provider encrypts the received execution plan with its encryption key Esp to ensure that projection is carried out over the component Web service FSM that is encrypted with the same set of keys. The execution plan extracted by applying the PRO} operation is also cOlllil l utatively encrypted with the For decryption of the extracted execution plan, County_A sends ECounty_AEState(7rCounty_A) to the state and it re ceives ECountY_A (7rCounty_A), which is then decrypted by County A using its decryption key to compute 7rCounty_A securely.
The above steps are repeated for levell, 2, and so on.
C. Complexity Analysis
We assume that the service composition hierarchy of Figure   6 has k levels and at any given level each service requester invokes the services of at most m service providers. We also assume that no component Web service FSM has more than n states. The service requester sri-l at level i-I, when verifying constraint satrisfaction for sri cannot see the events and internal operations included in the FSMs of service providers at level i as such FSMs even after decryption by applying the respective service providers' keys remain encrypted with the key of sri. Similarly, the component Web service FSM of sri sent to sri-l is also encrypted with the key of sri and so sri-l cannot learn the internal operations/events of sri except at level O. However, sri-l can learn which service providers are contracted by sri. Note that if P-III is not considered (line 12 of Protocol 1) then sr i -I receives the prod uct automata of constraints, i.e., EST, (Cw SP II CST, II· . CSTJ .
If instead, the service requester sri sends the encrypted constraints (Cw SP, CST" ... , CSTJ separately (i.e., without composing them in a parallel product automaton), sri-l could correlate the encrypted values for the individual constraint, say EST; (CSTj), to the events in CSTj that are visible to sri-I. This would enable sri-l to infer if some particular event occurs in any of the service providers FSM. To avoid such disclo sure, sri sends the parallel product automata of constraints rather than the individual constraint FSMs. Since the structure of ESTi(Cwsp II CSTl ll .. CSTJ (constraints that are visible to sri)and Cwsp II CST, II .. CST.;_, (constraints that are visible to sri -I) is different, it is unlikely that Cwsp II CST, II .. CST,_, is isomorphic to the subgraph of ESTi(Cwsp II CST, II .. CSTJ. Hence, it is unlikely that sr i -I can find the association between the encrypted value of some event that appears in any of the constraint visible to sri-I.
During the execution plan extraction phase, sri (i ?: 1) sees the overall execution plan, which is an interleaving of 145 the execution plan of the service providers. But sri cannot determine which portions of the execution plan comes from which service provider. However sro may learn the execution plan of its inunediate service providers though not of service providers at level 1 or greater. In summary, the privacy requirement P-II which is stricter than P-I is satisfied at each level i ;::: 1. At level 0, neither P-I nor P-II can be satisfied without involving a trusted third party. Also as discussed earlier, P-III can be satisfied at each level at the expense of increased computational and communication complexity due to delaying the detection of constraint violation of service requesters at higher levels.
V. RELATED WORK
The related work can be broadly categorized into i) policy conformance verification; ii) peer-to-peer service composition; and iii) information flow control.
Policy conformance approaches deal with checking the compatibility between service requester's security/privacy re quirements and Web service policies and process model [13] , [14] .
However, these approaches are primarily designed for single-level service composition and also do not prevent disclosure of internal operations/business process for both service providers and requester.
Peer-to-peer service composition approaches [15] , [16] , [17] deal with decentralized orchestration of a global business process, wherein participants only provide certain degree of inter-visibility to support peer-to-peer interactions. However, in the cascaded Web service environment the global process constraints may include dependency between events that may occur at multiple non-interacting component Web services. The peer-to-peer based service composition approaches may not ensure compliance of such event constraints without as suming that some special peers/participants have visibility to the processes of other peers at various levels of the service composition hierarchy.
Information flow control in the context of service com position has been recently addressed by She et al. [2] , [18] . Their approach enforces information flow control policies in service chains and enables runtime filtering of compositions that do not satisfy the policy requirements. Information flow control approaches assume a multi-level security hierarchy and ensure that information only flows from low security clearance services to high security clearance services. However, these approaches cannot be directly applied to the service compo sition, specifically enactment problem discussed in this paper that does not assume any multilevel security hierarchy and requires to prevent disclosure of the internal operations of an organization to its partners irrespective of their security clearance level.
VI. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we study the problem of secure composition of cascaded web services in a collaborative environment. We model three varying levels of privacy requirements that organizations may have. Our main contribution is to develop an encryption based automata theoretic approach that prevents the disclosure of policies and internal operations of service providers against service requesters at different levels in the composition hierarchy, and can satisfy all three levels of privacy. Our experimental results show that our approach is robust and scalable. In the future, we will also explore the use of threshold based encryption to make the protocol completely secure by removing the necessity of service providers having to disclose their decryption keys to the second level requester. We also plan to look at the privacy-preserving aspects of service discovery, service negotiation, and service execution.
